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Abstract
The concept of the New Environmental Politics of Urban Development (NEPUD) examines the impact of inter-
national and national environmental regulation on the politics of urban development. The NEPUD concept 
emerged from case studies of environmental governance in entrepreneurial cities. However, little is known 
about the concept’s relevance for less competitive cities, especially urban centres facing profound problems 
associated with economic decline, social deprivation and negative external images or ‘structurally disadvan-
taged cities.’ This paper examines how the NEPUD has played out within two structurally disadvantaged mari-
time port cities in Northern Europe, Hull (UK) and Bremerhaven (Germany). Both cities face serious social 
and economic challenges associated with long-term industrial decline, such as high unemployment rates, low 
skill levels, economic peripherality, and poor external images. Nevertheless, new opportunities opened up by 
climate change and the green economy have prompted political actors in Hull and Bremerhaven to build new 
alliances between local government, business and civil society and enhance governance capacities on climate 
change and green urban development. Highlighting similarities and differences between these two places, the 
paper reveals how climate change regulations provide opportunities for certain structurally disadvantaged 
cities to attract ‘green jobs’ and transform their external image.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Konzept der New Environmental Politics of Urban Development (NEPUD) reflektiert die wachsende Be-
deutung von Klimaschutz und Treibhausgasreduktionen in der Stadtentwicklungspolitik. Der NEPUD Ansatz 
hat sich aus Fallstudien zu umweltbezogenen Governanceansätzen in Städten entwickelt, die „unternehmeri-
sche“ Strategien als „entrepreneurial cities“ verfolgen. Der Ansatz wurde bislang jedoch noch nicht auf weniger 
konkurrenzfähige, durch tiefgehende sozio-ökonomische Problemlagen gekennzeichnete „strukturell benach-
teiligte Städte” angewendet. Der Artikel untersucht die vom NEPUD thematisierten Mechanismen in den zwei 
strukturell benachteiligten, maritim geprägten nordeuropäischen Hafenstädten Hull (Vereingtes Königreich) 
und Bremerhaven (Deutschland). Beide Städte sind als Folge des Niedergangs prägender Wirtschaftszweige mit 
schwerwiegenden ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen Herausforderungen konfrontiert, zu denen insbeson-
dere hohe Arbeitslosigkeitsquoten, niedrige Qualifikationsniveaus, Randlage und eine negativ geprägte Außen-
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1.  Introduction
Across Europe and North America, the negotiation 
of international agreements on climate change and 
reductions in carbon emissions is transforming the 
politics of urban development, creating both chal-
lenges as well as opportunities for city governments, 
business and civic organisations, and a range of other 
urban political actors. Such actors are striving – albeit 
with mixed success – to reconcile mainstream eco-
nomic development activities (e.g. attracting inward 
investment, supporting urban redevelopment, and 
improving infrastructure) with strategies to mitigate 
for climate change and reduce carbon emissions. Typi-
cal of these urban climate change strategies are: mak-ing infrastructure more resilient to sea level rise and 
flooding; reducing reliance on carbon intensive ener-
gy; developing jobs in ‘green’ sectors of the economy; and investing in low carbon transportation alterna-
tives. As cities come to terms with the challenges of 
climate change, moreover, they are finding new ways 
of marketing and rebranding themselves as, various-
ly, ‘green’, ‘sustainable’, ‘carbon neutral’, ‘smart’, and/
or ‘resilient’. In short, climate change is transform-
ing the politics of urban development in potentially 
far-reaching ways, suggesting the need to apply new 
theoretical ideas and concepts to the realm of urban 
development politics. 
Emerging from the geographical literature on ur-
ban sustainability and environmental governance 
(see, for instance, Gibbs and Jonas 2000; Krueger and 
Gibbs 2007; Bulkeley and Kern 2006; Kern and Bulkeley 
2009), the New Environmental Politics of Urban De-
velopment (NEPUD) is one such concept ( Jonas et al. 
2011). The NEPUD concept does not attempt to identi-
fy ideal types of urban climate governance. Instead, it 
seeks to understand the manner in which broader en-
vironmental regulatory processes (e.g. international 
agreements on climate change and carbon emissions) encourage or steer political actors in different urban 
wahrnehmung gehören. Nichtsdestotrotz haben sich durch den Klimawandel und die „Green Economy“ neue 
Möglichkeiten für politische Akteure in Hull und Bremerhaven ergeben, um neue Allianzen zum Klimaschutz 
und zur grünen Stadtentwicklung zwischen der Kommunalpolitik, Wirtschaft und Zivilgesellschaft zu schlie-
ßen. Die Analyse von Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschieden zwischen den beiden Fällen zeigt, wie vergleichende 
Studien zum Typ der strukturell benachteiligten Städte zu einem erweiterten Verständnis der Wirkungen von 
Klimaschutz und „Green Economy“ auf die Stadtentwicklungspolitik beitragen können.
Keywords climate change, green economy, urban politics, place image, structurally disadvantaged cities
places towards environmentally benign or ‘green’ 
forms of urban development alongside, or in addition 
to, more conventional economic development strate-
gies (e.g. competing for inward investment). Material 
and discursive strategies emerging around ‘green’ 
urban development are not only empowering new 
strategic alliances within urban governance but also 
encouraging new ways of marketing cities as greener, 
more environmentally sustainable places ( Jonas and 
While 2007). Nevertheless, cities facing profound eco-
nomic and social challenges continue to struggle to 
find a political balance between implementing climate 
change policies and reducing carbon emissions, on the 
one hand, and promoting economic development and 
sustaining social provision, on the other. We know 
surprisingly little about how such a political balance 
is achieved – if at all – in different cities operating 
within different national and international environ-
mental regulatory contexts.
The NEPUD concept was developed from empirical 
studies of entrepreneurial cities in Europe (e.g. Bar-
celona) and the USA (e.g. Seattle) ( Jonas et al. 2011; 
Jonas and While 2007). Although it was assumed to 
have much wider applicability, the NEPUD concept 
has yet to be applied to cities faced with profound eco-
nomic, social and environmental challenges or ‘struc-
turally disadvantaged cities’. We use this terminol-
ogy differently to that of ‘structurally disadvantaged 
communities’, a term which has appeared in studies of 
crime and poverty in inner cities in the United States 
(US) (Wilson1987; Kane 2005). The latter term seeks 
to capture the effects of social structures (e.g. race 
and class) on the economic and social marginalisation 
of minority populations in inner-city communities. 
In contrast, the former term, ‘structurally disadvan-
taged cities’, can be applied to small-to-medium sized 
cities in Europe grappling with problems of structural 
economic decline, mounting social problems, and neg-
ative external images. 
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Two examples of such structurally disadvantaged cit-
ies are the once-thriving maritime port cities of Hull 
(UK) and Bremerhaven (Germany) (see Fig. 1), both of 
which suffer from:• long-term decline of maritime-related industries 
(e.g. fishing and shipbuilding); • disused industrial assets and infrastructures  
(e.g. port facilities);• geographical remoteness or economic ‘peripheral-
ity’; • high unemployment, low/underutilised skills base 
and declining populations; • poor external image and marketing;• weak economic governance structures, shrinking 
tax bases, and susceptibility to austerity measures 
and/or state-imposed efforts to achieve balanced 
budgets.
The paper assesses how Bremerhaven and Hull have 
tried to turn at least some of the above-listed struc-
tural disadvantages into opportunities by adopting 
urban governance measures and/or facilitating busi-
ness and societal activities on climate change, renew-
able energy, and investment in green port facilities.1 
The research addressed the following three main 
questions: How are international and national climate 
change policies driving the urban development strat-
egies and policies of structurally disadvantaged cit-
ies? What political and other trade-offs are involved 
in the move towards a green economy in such places? 
Do similar structurally disadvantaged cities respond 
to climate change in the same or different ways as evi-
denced by their efforts to develop the green economy and engage in place promotion strategies? In attempt-
ing to answer these questions, this paper will provide 
empirical evidence for how the NEPUD concept could 
be applied to a category of cities that has tended to be 
overlooked in the literature on urban climate change 
governance, namely, structurally disadvantaged mar-
itime port cities. 
Hull Bremerhaven
London
Fig. 1 Location of Hull and Bremerhaven in relation to major UK and German offshore wind energy production regions in the North Sea. 
Sources: ESRI / T. Bettley October 2017; offshore wind energy production regions adapted from BIS Bremerhavener Gesellschaft für 
Investitionsförderung und Stadtentwicklung mbH, Bremerhaven: More than just a Port for the Offshore Wind Industry, November 
2013; Prognos AG, Regionalwirtschaftliche Potenzialanalyse für ein Offshore Terminal Bremerhaven, January 2011
200 DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 4/2017
2. Climate change, the green economy and the 
politics of urban development
Since the 1970s, the scope of international and nation-
al environmental regulation has reached into many 
spheres of urban politics and policy in North America and Europe ( Jonas et al. 2004; While et al. 2010). Fo-
cusing here on Europe, many climate change-induced 
regulations are adopted at the European Union (EU) 
and international level. These include the 1997 Kyo-
to Protocol and 2015 Paris Agreement as well as the 
EU’s 1989 burden sharing agreement and 2008 and 
2017 effort sharing decisions, which allocated to EU 
member states differentiated greenhouse gas emis-
sions (GHGE) reduction targets derived from the EU’s 
agreed collective reduction targets. Under the 1998 
EU burden sharing agreement the UK and Germany 
accepted reduction targets of 12.5 and 21 per cent 
respectively by 2012. In 2008, the EU’s ‘20-20-20 by 
2020’ energy and climate package put forward a uni-
lateral 20 per cent (and a conditional 30 per cent) 
reduction target by 2020. Additionally, it included 
a 20 per cent target for renewable energy and the 
goal to increase energy efficiency by 20 per cent. 
The EU’s effort sharing decision then allocated to 
the UK and Germany CO2 emission reduction targets 
of 16 per cent and 14 per cent respectively by 2020 
(compared to 2005) (Wurzel et al. 2017). In 2014, the 
EU agreed to a 40 per cent reduction of GHGE and an 
increase of renewable energy to 27 per cent by 2030. 
By 2050, the EU aims to reduce GHGE between 80 
to 90 per cent (compared to 1990) (EU Commission 
2015). Such targets require action at various levels of 
climate governance including the international, EU, 
national and, as we emphasise here, the urban scale. 
The UK and Germany have both also adopted national 
GHGE reduction targets which are more ambitious 
than the EU’s 2020 and 2030 targets. Importantly, 
Germany has decided to phase out nuclear power thus 
making the targets for renewable energy especially 
urgent.2 The outcome of the UK’s EU membership ref-
erendum in favour of leaving the EU (so-called Brexit) 
has thrown into doubt Britain’s continued commit-
ment to climate policies as agreed by the EU and its 
member states.3 Nonetheless, in November 2016 the 
UK government under the leadership of Prime Minis-
ter Theresa May ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement as 
negotiated by the EU and its member states. 
The landscape of urban development in the EU thus 
can be characterised by a high degree of inter-sca-
lar governance with respect to climate change and 
carbon reduction measures (Gibbs and Jonas 2000; 
Bulkeley and Kern 2006; While et al. 2010). At the 
same time, many cities are faced with austerity and 
intensified inter-urban competition for investment. 
Responding to these different pressures, economic 
development practitioners in many cities have ral-
lied around the ‘green economy’ (e.g. investments 
in renewable industries such as the manufacture of 
wind turbines) as a means for both promoting inward 
investment and transforming the urban economy around sectors often regarded to be more environ-
mentally benign than, for instance, traditional fossil-fuel industries (Gibbs 2002; Christopherson 2010). 
However, there is little consensus about what ‘green’ economic development entails for urban governance 
– nor agreement about how it should be implemented 
in different places. Whilst some advocates argue that 
any climate change-driven urban economic agenda 
must be built around social justice and resilience, 
others believe that new regulations, technologies 
and government incentives are sufficient to produce 
green economic development and jobs locally (see 
Christopherson 2010: 371). And if the creation of 
‘green jobs’ may offer distributional benefits to some 
workers in some cities, it might not politically empow-
er labour as a class nationally or internationally so 
much as enrol local workforces in divisive inter-urban competition (Deutz 2014). Furthermore, it is not clear 
how the green economy should be promoted locally 
alongside other mainstream place promotion strate-
gies. Given these different and sometimes conflicting 
perspectives, it is necessary to examine more closely 
how the climate change agenda in practice comes to 
ground at the urban scale and assess the manner in 
which it is integrated (or not, as the case may be) with 
other arenas and priorities within urban politics.
In order to address this challenge, the concept of the 
NEPUD has been proposed as a way of highlighting 
the growing centrality of climate change, carbon con-
trol and green economic development in discourses, strategies and struggles around urban development and place promotion ( Jonas et al. 2011). In particular, 
the NEPUD takes account of the political trade-offs involved in promoting green urban development ver-
sus mainstream economic development strategies. 
However, its relevance here is not simply in examin-
ing whether climate change is shaping how urban 
political actors assess the costs and benefits of inter-
urban competition but also whether efforts to green urban economic development are empowering new 
strategic alliances in urban politics and shaping ur-
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ban place promotion strategies. Despite the growing 
importance of climate change in urban politics, ur-
ban leaders across Europe continue to address many 
other political demands and pressures with respect to 
economic development and satisfying social needs in 
the urban living place. The green economy does offer 
an attractive answer to some of these demands and 
pressures for some places; but not for every place. For 
example, the switch to a low-carbon green economy 
is likely to involve negotiations and trade-offs around 
inward investment and job creation, on the one hand, 
and collective social provision (e.g. affordable hous-
ing, schools, etc.), on the other ( Jonas et al. 2011). How 
these trade-offs take place in structurally disadvan-
taged cities – places that were once heavily reliant upon traditional resource-consuming economic sec-
tors such as the shipbuilding, food processing and 
fishing industries – is not well documented. 
Based on studies of entrepreneurial cities, the inte-
gration of environmental agendas within urban gov-
ernance can be relatively non-conflictual especially in 
localities that are well endowed with fiscal resources, 
promote strong environmental sustainability agen-
das in local politics, and participate in wider environ-
mental networks ( Jonas et al. 2004; While et al. 2004). 
Indeed, policy innovations in response to climate 
change, such as green building policies, are increas-
ingly likely to be adopted by cities rather than nation states (Cidell 2015). However, one might expect this 
to be less typical of structurally disadvantaged cities, 
many of which are faced with severe economic and 
social problems, where environmental sustainability 
is low on the political agenda compared to social and 
economic regeneration, and linkages to wider envi-
ronmental policy networks are weak or altogether 
absent. Moreover, growing fiscal constraints in such 
cities – often imposed by central government − forces 
urban leaders to opt for short-term measures and rhe-
torical gestures in response to climate change. Since 
the 2008 financial crisis many former industrial cit-
ies in Europe face state-induced austerity measures, 
greater public spending controls, and outright fiscal 
retrenchment. Whilst some of these cities continue 
to struggle to attract investment, others still hope to capitalise upon new economic opportunities opening 
up around climate change and the green economy. For 
a few places the prospect of attracting ‘green jobs’ is 
seductive, especially given the lack of alternatives, 
but it nevertheless still requires the development of new urban alliances and governance capacities (Christopherson 2010; Rice 2010; Monaghan et al. 2013). 
In this context, differences between cities in terms of 
their inherited social, economic and political struc-
tures, as well as in respect of local-national relations 
within the state (as well as local-EU relations), creates 
opportunities for some places to attract ‘green jobs’ 
but not others. Indeed, such differences could lead to 
significant national variations in climate change gov-
ernance arrangements at the urban scale ( Jonas et al. 
2011). For example, German federalism as enshrined 
in the constitution guarantees local self-governance (kommunale Selbstverwaltung) leads to different lo-
cal governance structures in different German states (Länder). Whilst in the UK there has been some de-
volution of powers to cities (e.g. City Deals and the 
2001 Localism Act), this is occurring in the context of 
state-imposed austerity. Likewise, German local gov-
ernments’ room for manoeuvre has been curtailed by 
reforms to local government taxes, budgetary pres-
sures and federal government imposed debt limits. 
Europeanisation in the form of the liberalisation of 
public utilities has also been blamed for reducing lo-
cal governments’ climate change policy capabilities (Wollmann 2012).4 Consequently, pronounced Anglo-
German local governance differences which once 
existed have narrowed in recent years (Bulkeley and 
Kern 2006).
In both the UK and Germany, therefore, urban man-
agers and politicians have to find new ways of work-
ing locally with the private sector and civil society to 
develop strategies on climate change and the green 
economy. In the next three sections, we examine, 
firstly, the social and economic challenges faced by 
Hull and Bremerhaven respectively, secondly, how 
each city has developed new alliances and strategies 
to develop the green economy and, thirdly, accompa-
nying attempts to transform the external image of 
each city in turn. 
3. Attracting ‘green collar’ jobs: the challenges 
facing two structurally disadvantaged cities
Hull – a city of c. 259,000 inhabitants in 2015, locat-
ed on the Humber Estuary in North East England – 
is part of the Humber economic region (population 
c. 921,000) (Kingston upon Hull Data Observatory 
2017). This region includes the City of Hull, East Rid-
ing of Yorkshire, North Lincolnshire and North East 
Lincolnshire. Hull’s population has declined since it 
peaked at around 302,000 in 1931, falling to below 
244,000 in 2001; it has been moderately reversed since 
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2013 in part due to net in-migration from countries 
in the EU (Kingston upon Hull Data Observatory 2017; 
Interview, public official Hull, 2014). Hull has many of 
the economic and social attributes of a structurally 
disadvantaged city. It has undergone severe long-term 
industrial decline in the fishing and other maritime-
associated industries. In 2014, the city’s overall un-
employment rate was 13.5 per cent in 2014 as com-
pared to 10.2 per cent in the region and 7 per cent 
UK-wide; but as a proportion of the economically ac-
tive population, it was 7.3 per cent in Hull compared 
to 5.2 per cent in the region and 4.8 per cent nation-
ally in 2016 (NOMIS 2017). In a 2014 study ranking 
64 UK cities according to various economic and social 
criteria, Hull was ranked near the bottom in terms 
of earnings, job seekers allowance, and employment (Centre for Cities 2014). Moreover, Hull’s citizenry suf-
fers from chronic inter-generational unemployment, 
lack of skills development, and social exclusion. For 
example, the percentage of all households in Hull clas-
sified as ‘workless’ was 23.2 in 2016 compared to 15.3 
nationally (NOMIS 2017).5 
Innovation and entrepreneurialism – capacities deem-
ed indicative of successful cities – are in short supply 
in Hull, with many businesses not surviving past three 
years, and low overall business start-up rates (Inter-
view, economic development practitioner, Hull, 2014). 
Although there is plenty of cheap land suitable for 
economic development in the wider Humber region as 
well as on brownfield sites in Hull itself, investment 
returns tend to be low. Moreover, despite offering a range of incentives to prospective commercial and 
industrial firms, Hull has in more recent times strug-gled to attract inward investment (Gibbs et al. 2001). 
Importantly, the threat of flooding is a constant con-
cern for potential investors as devastating floods oc-
curred in 2007 and 2013. Crucially, the severe 2007 
flood prompted local officials and politicians to posi-
tion more prominently climate change issues on the 
local governance agenda (Interviews, Hull, 2014). 
Bremerhaven has also suffered from declining mar-
itime-related industries (e.g. shipbuilding and fish-
ing), persistent high unemployment, low skills base, 
poor educational attainment, population decline, 
geographic remoteness and flooding (Interviews, 
Bremerhaven, 2013-17). The City of Bremerhaven and 
the City of Bremen, which are 60 kilometres apart 
while being connected by the river Weser, are sur-
rounded by the state (Land) Lower-Saxony (Nieder-
sachsen), together form the Land Bremen which is the 
smallest of Germany’s 16 Länder. Bremen is one of Ger-
many’s poorest states and receives funds through the 
(horizontal) fiscal equalisation mechanism between 
the states (Länderfinanzausgleich) and (vertically) 
from the federal government although the richer Ger-
man states (e.g. Bavaria) have started to question the 
continuation of the existing rules.
In 1827, Bremen established a harbour for Bremen 
(‘Bremerhaven’) on the shores of the North Sea (the 
river Weser had silted up). To this day, the harbour of 
Bremerhaven is still owned and operated by the City 
of Bremen leading to occasional tensions between the 
two cities (Interviews, Bremerhaven, 2013-17). The 
closely intertwined political and administrative gov-
ernance structures of the Cities of Bremerhaven and 
Bremen are complex and cannot be assessed in this 
paper (for more details see e.g. Scherer 2010). Suf-
fice it to note that Bremerhaven has a City Parliament (Stadtverordnetenversammlung) and MPs who par-
ticipate in the joint State Parliament. In Bremerhaven 
the Magistrat acts as executive with responsibility for 
the implementation of local climate policy measures 
adopted by the Stadtverordnetenversammlung. 
In 2015, Bremerhaven had about 110,000 inhabitants 
and Land Bremen approximately 671,000. The unem-
ployment rate in Bremerhaven was 14.7 per cent in 
2015 (more than twice the German average unem-
ployment rate) (Statistisches Landesamt 2016). While 
Bremerhaven suffers from a poor external image 
this is not the case for Bremen (Interviews, Bremer-
haven and Bremen, 2013-17). Bremerhaven’s popula-
tion shrank by 10 per cent until 2005. However, since 
about 2012 Bremerhaven has reversed moderately 
the trend of a shrinking population (Mederake 2015: 
19). 
In recent years, Bremerhaven has attracted significant 
employers in the research sector (e.g. Alfred-Wege-
ner-Institute, Bremerhaven University and Fraunhofer 
Institute for Wind Energy), wind energy industry (e.g. 
Areva, PowerPlades, RePower and WeserWind6) and 
logistics companies. In 2009 the climate house Bremer-
haven 8° East (Klimahaus Bremerhaven 8° Ost) opened; 
it features climate change-related exhibitions and at-
tracts about half a million visitors annually.  
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4. Harnessing the green economy: institutions and 
strategies in Bremerhaven and Hull
Table 1 summarises similarities and differences be-
tween Hull and Bremerhaven in respect of key eco-
nomic, social and environmental indicators, such 
as population, unemployment, and ‘green jobs.’ In 
terms of growth around the green economy, Bremer-
haven is arguably ahead of Hull yet both cities have 
also retained jobs in some traditional sectors. In the 
1970s, Bremerhaven hosted one of Europe’s largest 
fishing industry with some 300 trawlers and fishing 
boats. Although employment in the fishing industry 
has since all but collapsed, Bremerhaven still has a 
large food industry specialising in frozen fish. Signifi-
cant attempts have been made to reduce GHGE from 
these factories (Interviews, officials Bremerhaven, 
2014). Several sites in Bremerhaven are devoted to 
the assembly and construction of wind turbines and 
tripods, and the city is planning the development of 
an offshore terminal (Offshore Terminal Bremerhaven 
– OTB). However, in late 2015 the planning decision 
in favour of building the OTB was challenged in court 
by an environmental NGO on the grounds that the 
terminal is apparently economically no longer viable 
following the insolvency of the tripod manufacturer 
WeserWind in early 2015. This has caused consider-
able uncertainty for the wind energy industry (Inter-
views, Bremerhaven, 2015-17). 
The Bremerhaven Economic Development Company (Bremerhavener Gesellschaft für Investitionsförderung 
und Stadtentwicklung mbH - BIS) promotes economic 
development in Bremerhaven. An environment di-
vision was set up within the BIS in 2003 following a 
local boom in the wind energy industry in the early 
2000s. The BIS’s efforts to attract green technology 
investment in Bremerhaven initially focused primar-
ily on the offshore wind energy industry although it 
has broadened its focus to the wider green economy 
following the collapse of WeserWind (Interviews, 
Bremerhaven, 2015-17). 
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110,000 
(671,000 Land Bremen)
Wind energy industry, port, logistics, 
food industry, Alfred-Wegener-Institut
(AWI), Bremerhaven University
14.7% 
(6.7% Germany national average)
Fishing industry, shipbuilding,
departure of US army
1962, 1999, 2006
Areva, PowerBlades, RePower 
and WeserWind
Fraunhofer Institute for Wind Energy; 
Bremerhaven University; 
Alfred-Wegener-Institute (AWI)
c. 3,000-4,000 Bremerhaven in 2014, 
c. 10,000 in Germany in 2014
259,000 
(921,000 Humber region)
Chemical industry, port, 
medical supplies, food industry, 
University of Hull
13.5% 
(7% UK national average)
Fishing industry, docks, 
food industry, shipbuilding
1953, 2007, 2013, 2016
Hull: Siemens, CS Wind (Green Port Hull); 
Paull: Siemens; North Killingholme: Able UK; 
Grimsby: Dong, Vestas
University of Hull;
Hull College Energy and Climate Centre
Siemens Hull: c. 800 in 2016, 
c. 6,830 in UK in 2013
Bremerhaven Hull
Population (2015)
Major employers
Unemployment rate (2014)
Declining and former 
industrial sectors
Major ooding events
Oshore wind turbine and 
tripod manufacturers
Oshore wind energy related 
research institutions
Direct jobs in oshore wind 
energy industry (2016)
Table 1 A comparison of selected economic, social and environmen-
tal indicators for Bremerhaven and Hull. Sources: Interviews 
2014-17; Statistisches Landesamt 2016; Humber LEP 2015; 
Kingston upon Hull Data Observatory 2017
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As mentioned above, structurally disadvantaged European cities are not immune from regulation-
induced economic developments on the national and 
EU level. In Bremerhaven, the gold rush fever for the 
offshore wind energy industry cooled when a newly 
elected federal government (made up of the Chris-
tian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/
CSU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD)) revised the 
federal renewable energy law (Erneuerbare Energien-
Gesetz – EEG) in 2014, resulting in changes to the feed-
in tariff thus causing uncertainty, delayed investment 
and even job losses in Bremerhaven. The Northern 
German coastal states, which benefit most from off- 
and onshore wind energy production teamed up to 
lobby the federal government for continued govern-
ment support for offshore wind energy; these lobby-
ing activities were largely successful leading again to 
a more stable investment climate for offshore wind 
energy development.
Bremerhaven has taken measures to adapt to future 
sea-level rise and shore up sea-level defences especial-
ly around infrastructural assets. However, it has also 
taken significant climate change mitigation measures 
including the adoption of plans to lower CO2 emissions 
by 40 per cent in 2020 (compared to 1990). Bremer-
haven participates in the European Energy Award 
(EEA), which is an energy management and certifica-
tion system for cities with more than 100,000 inhabit-
ants, and the municipal Master Plan for Active Climate 
Policy (Masterplan aktive Klimapolitik - MAK) which 
involves collaboration with the wider region. Howev-
er, severe budget cuts in 2016 have thrown into doubt 
Bremerhaven’s future participation in the EEA (Inter-
view, Bremerhaven, 2016). Bremerhaven has adopted 
a wide range of other climate actions including cycling 
paths, electrical mobility, hosting a rally for electric 
cars powered by renewable energy, climate-friendly 
tourism and passive house nurseries.
Besides flood prevention, Hull is also developing gov-
ernance capacities around the green economy while 
the wider Humber region is repositioning itself to be 
the UK’s ‘renewable energy capital’. One of the main 
triggers of this transformation has been the prospect 
of developing the renewable energy sector around the 
estuary. Most notably this has involved a new Green 
Port facility in Hull for the manufacture of offshore 
wind turbines. In 2011, in association with the pros-
pect of significant investment by Siemens, the £210m 
Green Port Hull project was proposed as a major new 
facility to be managed by Associated British Ports. In 
March 2014, Siemens announced its decision to invest 
£160 million in wind turbine production and instal-
lation and a new blade manufacturing facility closer 
to the mouth of the Humber Estuary.7 Despite con-
cerns about the long-term impact of Brexit on inward 
investment, in 2015 Siemens commenced its hiring of 
local trainees to work on the production of wind tur-
bines at its Hull facility. 
Motivated by the achievement of attracting Siemens 
to Hull, local economic development practitioners 
have seen an opportunity to address the City’s long-
standing structural disadvantages. In 2012, Hull 
adopted a 10-year City Plan to attract £1bn in invest-
ment and generate ‘green collar jobs’ through a ‘ma-
jor economic refit’ including exploiting opportunities 
in the renewable energy sector. As a central compo-
nent of this, Energy City Hull was initiated by the City 
Council to connect organisations “to work together to 
take advantage of a changing social and political land-
scape to accelerate change in the city. The main aim 
of the plan is to create up to 8,000 new jobs for local 
job-seekers over the next 10 years, which would inject 
over £200m into the local economy” (Hull City Council 
2012a). At the same time, the City Council established 
a Green City Group to develop a “green vision for the 
city” (Hull City Council 2012b). Whilst the Group met 
on a regular basis between 2011 and 2012, since then 
it has not been publicly active. In 2013, the Mini-Stern 
Report for the Humber identified need for £1.8bn in-
vestment in the low carbon economy, while arguing for developing new governance capacities for promot-ing green investments (Gouldson et al. 2013).
A key strategic actor in Hull’s proposed economic 
transformation is the Humber Local Enterprise Part-
nership (LEP) which was set up in 2013. The Humber 
LEP explicitly seeks to link climate change with re-
gional economic development. Following the election 
of the Conservative-Liberal coalition government in 
the UK in 2010, LEPs, which are private-sector led but 
with public sector representation, replaced Regional 
Development Agencies. In its Strategic Economic Plan, 
the Humber LEP emphasises the region’s large estu-
ary and associated capacities based on logistics and 
the ports (Humber LEP 2015). The LEP quickly recog-
nised that addressing climate change is essential to 
the competitiveness of the city and region. There are 
two considerations here: (1) building inward investor 
confidence; and (2) reducing flooding risk. The LEP 
has also participated in developing the Humber Spa-
tial Plan, which grew out of partnership working with 
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several statutory bodies across the region as well as 
environmental organisations and not-for-profits, in-
cluding nature and conservation partnerships (Inter-
view, economic development practitioner, Hull 2014). 
As one local economic development practitioner has 
argued, the plan is to put “the Humber [at] the centre 
of renewable energy [in the UK] – so that when people 
think of energy they will think of the Humber” (Inter-
view, Hull, 2014). Nevertheless, many businesses and 
industries in Hull rely upon conventional sources of 
energy, suggesting that efforts to rebrand the City as 
the UK ‘renewable energy capital’ were likely to en-
counter some obstacles, which we now describe.
5. Climate change, the green economy and reim-
agining the city
So far, we have considered how two structurally dis-
advantaged cities, Hull and Bremerhaven, have start-ed to capitalise on investment and economic develop-
ment opportunities around climate change and the 
green economy. In both cases, distinctive strategies 
have emerged around developing new sectors and at-
tracting inward investment around renewable energy 
(especially offshore wind energy). However, it would 
seem that the corresponding governance capacities 
and institutions are more developed in Bremerhaven 
compared to Hull. In both cities, moreover, these or-
ganisational changes within urban governance are 
being driven primarily by regional and national scale 
governance processes. We now consider how these 
cities are being reimagined, and associated changes 
in branding strategies and external images. Here we 
see crucial links between climate change, the green 
economy and place imagination; linkages also recog-
nised in the concept of the NEPUD.   
The expanding literature around how cities market 
themselves has flagged up the growing importance of 
‘greening’ strategies for place branding and reimag-ining (Andersson 2016; Cidell 2015). Much of this lit-
erature has focused on describing various ‘green’ or 
‘carbon neutral’ place promotion strategies initiated 
by entrepreneurial cities, highlighting how such strat-
egies have been adapted and modified as such cities 
undergo economic and social restructuring, even to 
the point that transforming disused industrial land-
scapes into green spaces has become emblematic of 
economic prosperity in the post-Fordist industrial age (Keil and Graham 1998; Anderberg and Clark 2013). To 
take one example from this literature, Short (1999) 
talks of how cities undergo different regimes of rep-
resentation, each involving distinct urban brands, slo-
gans, identities, and representations. Playing on the 
idea that cities no longer engage in chasing smoke-
stack industries, Short refers to one such regime as 
‘Look No More Factories!’ In this representation, the 
competitive city is one that attracts environmental-
ly clean high tech industries and producer services. 
Moreover, it is a place which actively seeks to sup-
press images of its polluted industrial past through 
the reimagining of vestigial industrial landscapes as 
green spaces, creating attractive waterfronts (devoid 
of polluting heavy industry), and marketing the city 
as environmentally friendly.
If the process of reimagining the city through, for ex-
ample, the greening of public space has reaped eco-
nomic rewards especially for certain entrepreneurial cities ( Jonas and While 2007), the corresponding ef-
forts in structurally disadvantaged cities requires 
confronting more than just the challenges of trans-
forming the built environment. Far more challenging 
is the relationship between capital flight and loss of 
jobs and associated identities among the local popula-
tion. Cox and Mair (1988) argue that often it is urban 
political actors who are most dependent upon growth 
that strive to fill the void in local meaning and signifi-
cation created by the loss of local jobs and livelihoods 
caused by disinvestment, which is a profound chal-
lenge in structurally disadvantaged cities. Typically, 
new urban imaginaries emerge not so much from the local population as from new alliances and coalitions forged between local business interests and urban 
government as these actors, in turn, strive to attract 
new investments into the locality. However, foster-ing new urban imaginaries can be a source of tension 
with local communities as different visions and ideas 
of place and community are up for grabs. For instance, 
Hesse (2015) distinguishes between local economic 
development strategies that promote progressive 
ideologies and visions of urban and regional growth 
based around, for instance, high technology indus-
try and logistics, and other strategies that draw on 
alternative meanings and ideologies, such as sustain-
ability and community empowerment. In the former 
category, one can refer to the place promotion efforts of cities and states involved in selling and promoting 
regional hubs or national logistic centres. In the latter, 
we can refer to the recent experiences of places like 
Hull and Bremerhaven.
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Of the two cities discussed here, Bremerhaven has 
arguably gone further than Hull to exploit the op-
portunities created by climate change and the green 
economy for reimaging the city. Indeed, Bremer-
haven is rebranding itself as Klimastadt while also 
adopting significant climate change policy measures. 
However, it is important to note that this rebranding 
is occurring in a regional context where discussions 
and debates are ongoing at the state (Bremen) level 
about where to prioritise infrastructure and urban 
development investment especially around ports and 
logistics. Following a conceptual feasibility study 
conducted in 2008-9 (AWI 2009) and long drawn out 
discussions about financial support, the Klimastadt 
Bremerhaven – officially called Course Climate City 
Bremerhaven (Kurs Klimastadt Bremerhaven) thus il-
lustrating that it is an ongoing goal rather than a final 
destination – was eventually established in 2011 with 
50 per cent of its funding each coming from the BIS 
and the Senate Bremen. Its main aim has been to as-
sist in changing Bremerhaven’s image from ‘fish town’ 
to ‘climate city’ while involving not only businesses 
and scientific research institutes but also civil society 
(Interviews, Bremerhaven 2014-17; Mederake 2015). 
The climate city fosters involvement by theatres, 
schools and young people by, for example, organising 
a Youth Climate Council ( Jugendklimarat) with its own 
budget and access to Environment Committee meet-
ings of the City Parliament. A Klimastadt office which 
combines the functions of climate governance admin-istration and general public advice on climate-related 
issues opened at a prime location in the city centre in 
November 2014. 
Crucially, the initial conceptual study Klimastadt 
Bremerhaven (AWI 2009) which had been commis-sioned under a grand coalition8 (CDU/CSU-SPD) gov-
ernment in the City Parliament did not yet emphasise 
the involvement of civil society. Instead, it focused 
almost exclusively on businesses and research in-
stitutes (Interview, Bremerhaven 2015). It was only 
when a SPD-Green Party coalition government gained 
a majority in Bremerhaven’s City Parliament in 2011 
that the Green Party Environmental Councillor in-
sisted on the inclusion of civil society actors in the 
Klimastadt project thus necessitating a revision of the 
original concept (Interviews, Bremerhaven, 2014-17). 
However, the active inclusion of civil society actors in 
the Klimastadt project seems to have made the project 
less attractive for businesses whose levels of commit-
ment have remained moderate (Interviews, business 
representative, 2015-16). Although the possible clo-
sure of the Climate City Office in the city centre, which 
had been discussed in 2016 within the context of the 
need to make severe budget cuts, has been averted, 
the Climate City Office lost one senior part-time mem-
ber of staff and had to move to a less central location 
in 2017 (Interviews, Bremerhaven, 2017).
Bremerhaven hosted a ‘Climate City Day’ on June 15, 
2013, with the slogan ‘we come to the people.’ Activi-
ties included rent-a-bike, ‘fish and ships’ trips around 
the harbour, and an energy efficiency table. Schools, 
the local theatre and artists have also been involved 
in climate change-related activities. The city thea-
tre staged a transdisciplinary festival called ‘Odys-
sey: Climate’ (Odyssee Klima) which featured climate 
change related plays and short performances by ac-
tors and scientists in Bremerhaven’s pedestrianised 
city centre and in some wind turbine assembly fac-
tories (Interviews, Bremerhaven, 2015-17). Clearly, 
such climate change related activities go well beyond 
what has conventionally been defined as the (local) 
green economy. 
In Bremerhaven, climate change has been used not 
only to create economic opportunities for business 
and employment for scientific researchers but also 
openings for artists to showcase their creativity and 
for citizens to get actively involved. It is too early to 
say anything about the long-term sustainability of 
such a wide range of climate change related activi-
ties. However, the Klimastadt Bremerhaven project 
has clearly enabled “the municipality to increase its 
sphere of (political) influence and its scope of action” (Mederake 2015: 384). In other words, the Klimastadt 
Bremerhaven project has allowed local officials and 
politicians to widen their room for manoeuvre on cli-
mate change-related initiatives in economic difficult 
times while engaging with businesses and research-
ers as well as civil society actors.
Unlike Bremerhaven, which has actively used the ‘cli-
mate city’ theme as a rebranding strategy, in Hull the 
story is more complicated and, if anything, a source of 
stronger ongoing tensions and contradictions. One im-
portant reason for it is that Hull still relies heavily on 
carbon-intensive industries (e.g. chemicals) for local 
jobs. Furthermore, wind turbine production in Hull is 
only a fledgling industry while Hull’s City Council has 
adopted less ambitious local GHGE targets when com-
pared to Bremerhaven. Whilst major actors in Hull 
are starting to see opportunities in maritime herit-
age and the green economy as vehicles for overcoming 
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negative images of the city, only in recent years has 
this started to cohere around a coordinated strategy. 
Thus there are increasing references to opportunities 
for the city to reconnect with its maritime past, to 
make the most of its natural assets and, especially, the 
estuary, to invest in more resilient infrastructure, to 
use the investments by Siemens in Green Port Hull as 
catalysts to develop the renewable energy economy, 
and most recently to capitalise on the city’s successful 
bid to be UK City of Culture 2017. 
Many of our interviewees argued that there is a “once 
in a generation opportunity” for Hull to make real 
change (Interviews, Hull, 2014-15). In order to meet 
the climate change challenge, limited changes have 
been made to governance structures, notably the cre-
ation of a city leadership board including inputs from 
across the local authority and stakeholders. Hull City 
Council is supportive of the new investments in Green 
Port Hull but mainly in order to realise the employ-
ment potentials. If it did not seem apparent that cli-
mate change had the potential to create ‘green jobs’, 
then there would not be so much investment of time 
and money in developing the green economy along 
such lines.
One of the net effects of all of this has been a more 
focussed effort to talk up Hull and the Humber as the 
‘renewable energy capital’ of the UK, something which 
has emerged out of previous initiatives to impose a 
stronger sense of economic identity on the region in 
the absence of any clear alternatives based in Hull and 
the wider Humber region. The problem is that...
... there was no Humber identity, [even though] 
there had been previous organisations. There had 
been a Humber Trade Zone, Humber Forum, Hum-
ber Economic Partnership and all of those had gone 
and there was a gap of about nine months before 
the LEP came along ... and the LEP was the only 
Humber entity apart from police and fire of any sig-
nificance at that time. (Interview, economic devel-
opment practitioner, Hull, 2014) 
This message has come to be expressed more widely, 
especially by those organisations and political actors 
charged with providing a stronger voice for the region 
nationally (see e.g. Hughes 2015). As Karl Turner (La-
bour), the MP for Hull East has argued, “Hull is well 
placed to be the renewables capital of the UK. This 
exciting opportunity guarantees jobs, helps the envi-
ronment and will boost Hull’s economy for future gen-
erations” (quoted in Marsh 2012, no page no.). None-
theless, although welcoming the prospect of inward 
investment, some local business leaders have publicly 
expressed a concern that “concentrating too heavily 
on only certain, high-profile projects, such as offshore 
wind, would not allow the region to properly flourish 
and become a true leader in green energy” (Offshore 
Wind 2012, no page no.). Furthermore:
In one sense it is very important a company like 
Siemens is a magnet for other companies as well 
because ... we are seeing investment on the back of 
that. [Yet] in another sense it can be a bit of a false 
thing to hope for because with some investors they 
will come in and [invest in a] factory and employ 
some people, but it may not be local people in the 
end. (Interview, economic development practition-
er, Hull, 2014)
Thus for some in Hull the sustainability of the green 
economy remains in doubt so long as more fundamen-
tal measures to address the city’s structural problems 
are not undertaken. 
Whilst the city has embarked upon community-led 
regeneration initiatives, the prospect of the UK leav-
ing the EU does not bode well for both the long-term 
future of EU funding in Hull and the feasibility of 
wind energy industry exports to the EU post-Brexit, 
although this will depend on the future trading rela-
tionship which the UK will strike with the EU and its 
member states. In this context, ongoing efforts to pro-
mote Hull as a ‘city of culture’ resonate quite well with 
the interests, aspirations and concerns of local com-
munities and political leaders in Hull, arguably more 
so than the corresponding efforts to represent the 
city as a leader on climate change and renewable en-
ergy. Nonetheless, there have been symbolic attempts 
to bring these potentially competing strategies closer 
together, such as the decision in early 2017 to place a 
temporary artwork called ‘The Blade’ in the city cen-
tre of Hull in the form of a giant wind turbine blade 
– the blade had been manufactured at Siemens’ Green 
Port Hull factory.
6. Discussion and conclusions
Drawing upon case studies of Hull and Bremerhaven, 
this paper has used theoretical insights from the lit-
erature on urban sustainability and environmental 
governance in order to examine how climate change 
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has worked its way into the political, social and eco-
nomic fabric of two structurally disadvantaged cities. 
Such cities can be characterised as places that have 
experienced long-term decline in traditional indus-
trial sectors, state-imposed austerity measures, and 
negative external images. Although as a consequence 
facing deeply-entrenched social, economic and cul-
tural challenges, both cities have in more recent years 
embarked on ambitious strategies around green eco-
nomic development and place marketing which (at 
least in Bremerhaven’s case) go well beyond received 
knowledge based on the concept of the NEPUD. We 
now conclude by reflecting upon how this compara-
tive study offers some more general insights into the 
workings of environmental and sustainability gov-
ernance in structurally disadvantaged cities. 
The first general finding is that international and na-
tional policies on climate change seem to provide se-lective opportunities for local political actors in struc-
turally disadvantaged cities to build new alliances 
across local government, business and civil society in 
order to attract ‘green jobs’. However, such opportu-
nities are place-specific and depend on the presence 
of contingent factors such as, in the cases examined 
here, access to port and manufacturing facilities suit-
able for developing off-shore wind farm production. 
The experiences of Hull and, although arguably to a 
lesser degree, Bremerhaven appear to confirm the ar-
gument that in times of austerity urban leaders tend 
to shun broader social and environmental objectives 
in favour of cost-effective short-term measures and 
interventions that focus on jobs and investment rath-
er than long-term social, political and environmental transformations ( Jonas et al. 2011).
Nevertheless, secondly, our research seems to con-
firm claims in the NEPUD literature that climate 
change and carbon emissions policies are transform-
ing urban political discourses and ushering in new 
ways of legitimating the costs and benefits of major 
economic development projects such as green port 
facilities. Structurally disadvantaged cities like Hull 
and Bremerhaven might not be entrepreneurial in a 
narrowly economic sense but nonetheless do exhibit 
innovative policies and strategies not just in terms of 
how to deal with the challenges of climate change for 
local economic development but also in terms of the 
involvement of civil society actors around the green 
economy, broadly defined. In fact, the examples exam-
ined in this paper demonstrate the resilience of cer-
tain cities faced with profound structural disadvan-
tages. Hitherto, climate resilience has been associated 
with physical planning interventions that protect key 
urban assets from sea-level rise, such as strategic in-
frastructure and commercial property, rather than 
address wider social and economic challenges (see 
e.g. MacKinnon and Derickson 2012). Yet the structur-
ally disadvantaged cities examined here appear to be 
developing governance capacities which extend into 
spheres of economy and civic life well beyond what is 
conventionally regarded as ‘climate resilient’. 
Thirdly, policies on climate change and green eco-nomic development also provide opportunities for 
certain structurally disadvantaged cities to nurture 
a more positive external image (or, at the very least, 
to overcome some negative social stereotypes with 
which they may be associated). Both our examples 
demonstrate how securing investment in the green 
economy requires forward thinking and planning 
with respect to urban place promotion: it forces ur-ban political actors imagine alternative urban fu-
tures, which build on existing economic assets and 
cultural resources whilst also developing new institu-
tions and place identities. To some degree this is an 
extension and modification of what scholars like Short 
(1999) predict in that vestigial and decayed industrial 
landscapes not only can be reimagined in new ways 
for consumption but also can be socially transformed 
around arguably more environmentally beneficial 
forms of production. 
Finally, this paper contributes to wider discussions 
about the changing forms of urban sustainability and 
environmental governance. Previous studies of the 
NEPUD might have underestimated the depth and scope of social and environmental constraints and 
challenges faced by different kinds of cities resulting 
from their historic role in wider spatial divisions of 
production and consumption. Our focus has been on 
two structurally disadvantaged cities where, despite 
significant economic, social and political challenges, 
quite substantive progress has been made on devel-
oping the local green economy, addressing climate 
change, and transforming the external image of both 
places. The wider literature on urban sustainability 
and environmental governance likewise could ben-
efit from the analysis of a larger sample of structur-
ally disadvantaged cities. Here we endorse recent 
calls for further comparative research on groups of 
cities which tend to get overlooked in mainstream 
urban theory and research (Robinson 2011); places, in 
other words, that are often deemed peripheral both 
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geographically and also in terms of how they help to 
inform wider theoretical ideas and concepts. More 
specifically, we suggest that the concept of ‘struc-
turally disadvantaged cities’ helps to expand our 
understanding of how climate change and the green 
economy work through certain kinds of cities having 
broadly similar economic, social and cultural charac-
teristics.  
Notes
1 The research draws upon more than 45 interviews con-
ducted with officials, researchers and stakeholders in 
Hull, Bremerhaven, Bremen, and Berlin between 2013 and 
February 2017. In addition, workshops were held with 
practitioners in Bremerhaven and Hull in 2013 and 2014. 
2 This paper is not the place to assess the inter-linkages be-
tween the various scales of climate change governance in 
Europe. Rather it examines the challenges and opportuni-
ties that climate change and the green economy provide 
to structurally disadvantaged cities which, however, are 
influenced by climate change policies agreed at ‘higher’ 
levels of governance. 
3 Like most environmental treaties, the 1997 Kyoto Proto-
col and 2015 Paris Agreement are signed and ratified as 
so-called mixed agreements by both the EU and its mem-
ber states including the UK. At the time of writing, the USA 
had indicated its intention to withdraw from the 2015 
Paris Agreement. In 2001, the USA abandoned the Kyoto 
Protocol without causing any major impact on the remain-
ing signatories which ratified and implemented the Proto-
col. 
4 German local governments once owned public utilities 
through Stadtwerke that provided energy and water to 
local customers. However, many Stadtwerke have been 
privatised due to the German federal government’s sup-
port the liberalisation of utilities within a Single European 
Market, austerity measures and the constitutional goal of 
balanced budgets.
5 In the 2016 referendum on the UK’s future membership of 
the EU, more than twice as many voters in Hull voted to 
leave the EU as those who voted to remain. Voter turnout 
in the city was c. 63 per cent.
6 WeserWind became insolvent in early 2015. In 2017, Pow-
erBlades announced the closure of its Bremerhaven facil-
ity.7 However, plans for the additional facility in the East Rid-
ing were subsequently shelved. 
8 In Germany, grand coalitions are made up of the two larg-
est political parties represented in parliament.
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